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Introduction 
On 1 September 1939 Adolf Hitler convened a session of the Reichstag to 
announce war with Poland. Dressed in a grey field tunic, he declared that Polish 
aggression would be suppressed, and that he would wear the tunic until "victory is 
ours, or, I shall not live to see the day!"1 Germany did not win the war, and Hitler 
did not live to see the day of its defeat. The established record of the Second 
World War adequately portrays what happened, and the chronology is ingrained. 
Nevertheless, aspects of the war have been neglected, especially in relation to 
command issues within the German armed forces. Because of the prominence of 
Hitler in all accounts, the actions of those below him have traditionally been 
marginalised. The purpose of this thesis is to address this 'gap' in history by 
evaluating the overall German military leadership's attempt to direct war in 
simultaneous theatres. 
Using primary sources such as war diaries, memoirs, and various accounts of 
Fuhrer conferences, this study will analyse how the unique German command 
structure eventually contributed heavily to Germany's defeat. While many authors 
hold Hitler solely responsible for defeat, and thus overlook the role of others, my 
work is primarily concerned with analysing the German High Command structure 
and its attempt to direct war on multiple fronts at the same time. Responsibility for 
eventual German defeat cannot be laid at Hitler's feet alone because while he 
maintained sole executive powers, he remained open to the suggestions of those 
in his inner circle. In the end, those figures, who will be discussed in this study, 
failed Germany because they were unable to present a united front against Hitler 
when the situation became critical for the armed forces after 1941 . 
Because of Germany's initial success, the perception of invincibility that Hitler 
so cherished became global and unquestionable. However, behind the facade, 
the world did not see the tensions between the individual services of the armed 
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forces regarding the conduct of operations. The tensions that would hinder 
German operations during the war were already festering during the formative 
stages of the post-Versailles armed forces. This inter-service conflict resulted 
from a proposal that the individual prerogatives of each service be denied in 
favour of a joint-service command structure. 
In this proposal, unity of the services became preferable to individual action. 
On 21 May 1935, the adoption of unity in the German armed forces became 
official through the Military Service Act. Hitler reformed the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force High Command structures and stipulated that an umbrella organisation 
called the Armed Forces High Command would be made their superior. This 
organisation would plan and co-ordinate all operations, which Hitler would then 
order the three branches to execute. Thus, as early as 1935, the command 
structure that the German armed forces would use during the war was already in 
place. 
In response to Hitler's move, the services roundly condemned the possibility 
that they might lose their traditional right to conduct independent operations. This 
resistance continued after he became Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces 
in 1938, even though it became somewhat muted. While the Wehrmacht 
advanced during 1939 and 1940, these tensions remained controlled. However, 
as the war situation deteriorated after 1941 , the command structure increasingly 
became fragmented. Frequently, Hitler would have to mediate between feuding 
Commanders-in-Chief in an attempt to maintain unity. Paradoxically, he also 
worked against unity by skilfully using this tension to reinforce his position as 
Fuhrer by adding more responsibilities to his portfolios. Hence, because of the 
situation, with Hitler as Head of both the state and military, when the armed forces 
became involved in simultaneous multi-theatre warfare, its command structure 
fragmented as the Fuhrer lost control over the course of the war. 
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Integral to simultaneous multi-theatre warfare was the necessary maintenance 
of the Axis coalition by the Germans. Throughout the war this proved a problem. 
There were many instances of conflict over command responsibility, especially 
when Germany became involved in combined operations with Italy. Yet Hitler 
would not subordinate Italian forces to German command (despite the pleas of his 
generals) because he wished not to insult his ally, Benito Mussolini. Their 
inability to see their Axis allies as equals, as well as Hitler's inability to bring the 
Italians under full German command, combined to frustrate Germany's war effort. 
Furthermore, as the manpower and raw material situation deteriorated as the war 
became protracted, tension between Italy and Germany heightened when Italy 
continued to demand German resources that were sorely needed elsewhere. 
The crux of my thesis is the way the German leadership responded to the 
stress of conducting warfare on several vast, and diverse, theatres 
simultaneously. Hence, the purpose of this study is not an evaluation of Hitler as 
Supreme Commander. Undoubtedly, he limited Germany's chances of ultimate 
success because of his inability to allow others, who were possibly more qualified 
than him, to make crucial decisions regarding operations. However, this thesis 
will focus on the command structure beneath Hitler, and its direction of the war, 
with the purpose of highlighting command, control, and communication problems 
brought on by multi-theatre warfare. Nevertheless, Hitler wi ll often feature in this 
study because without him it is doubtful whether Germany could have returned to 
a position of dominance in Europe in the first place. 
Hitler's penchant for the innovative, and unusual, protected the new idea of 
unity from the condemnation of the conservative Army. Furthermore, Hitler 
adopted advances in armoured tactics, the use of air power, and radical 
operational plans such as that used against France, despite the fervent objections 
of his advisers. Initial German success gave those disenchanted with the 
direction of the war no grounds for opposition, while Hitler gained an exaggerated 
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impression of his powers. To all, the German command model appeared 
revolutionary; and it was. To this day it remains apposite. Nevertheless, this 
study will highlight that while this might be true in theory, in practice, the model 
had many inherent flaws and tensions. Therefore, while the German command 
structure remains relevant, during the Second World War, because of its leading 
personalities, it contributed heavily to Germany's defeat. 
